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Abstract
The issue of Fitting Attitudes inherit the much-discussed ‘wrong kind of reason’ 
problem (WKR) that affl icts some accounts. The problem remained to attempts 
to give an account of FA is to specify the right kinds of reasons, to specify the 
right notion of fi ttingness. A number of solutions have been proposed to solve 
WKR. ‘Conceptual thesis’ abou t attitude formation and the ‘psychological 
thesis’. The text discusses both of it, raising some questions about them, but 
also wish to emphasize that the understanding of FA that is supposed to lead 
to WKR is problematic. An important thing to be brought seems to be that, 
when applied to essentially contestable concepts, fi tting attitude analyses, 
understood properly (i.e. without unwarranted presuppositions about the very 
value in dispute) will not result in WKR as conceived in the kinds of examples 
given earlier. Exploring the issue of Fitting Attitudes and giving to it an alterna-
tive account is the main goal of the present paper.
Key words: fi tting attitudes, contestable, concepts.
Resumo
A questão das Atitudes Apropriadas (FA) herda o problema muito discutido 
do “tipo errado de razão” que afl ige algumas tentativas de resposta a ela. O 
problema remanescente para tentativas de dar conta das FA é especifi car o 
tipo correto de razões (WKR), especifi car a noção correta de fi ttingness (ade-
quação). Numerosas soluções foram propostas para resolver o problema. Duas 
delas são a tese conceitual sobre a formação de atitudes e a tese psicológica. 
O texto discute ambas levantando algumas questões, mas também enfatiza 
que a compreensão das FA que supostamente leva ao problema das WKR é 
problemática. Algo importante a ser trazido parece ser o de que, quando apli-
cada a conceitos essencialmente contestáveis, a análise das FA não resultarão 
em WKR. Sendo assim, explorar a questão das FA é dar a ela uma abordagem 
alternativa é o objetivo central do presente texto.
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Introduction
Fitting Attitude analyses of value (henceforth FA) hold that for something to 
be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude, where ‘fittingness’ is to 
be understood as some kind of normative constraint governing the ‘correct’ way of 
responding to some object or situation (X); that is, the way that reflects the value of X:
FA: To apply an evaluative concept  to an object/situation X is to think it fitting 
to have some particular pro-attitude A towards X. (adapted from D’Arms and 
Jacobsen, 2000b).
FA inherit the general attractions of buck-passing accounts of value, promising 
to “demystify values” by avoiding the metaphysical and epistemological difficulties 
involved in identifying them (see Lang, 2008; Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen, 
2004) Moreover, they are supposed to be neutral between realist and anti-realist 
accounts of value, for the relevant judgements of fittingness can, it seems, be con-
strued cognitively or non-cognitively (D’Arms and Jacobsen, 2000a).
Unfortunately, however, FA also inherit the much-discussed ‘wrong kind of 
reason’ problem (henceforth WKR) that afflicts buck-passing accounts.2 This is the 
difficulty of providing a noncircular method of distinguishing the reasons that bear on 
the value of X from those that do not; that is, of distinguishing the attitudes that are 
(genuinely) fitting – that reveal the value of X – from those that are not. The problem 
is thus to specify the right kinds of reasons, to specify the right notion of fittingness. 
The use of examples in setting up this problem, and hence in establishing the ultimate 
plausibility of FA, is important. Here are two typical cases from the literature:
(1) “Imagine that an evil demon will inflict a severe pain on me unless I prefer this 
saucer of mud; that makes the saucer well worth preferring. But it would not be 
plausible to claim that the saucer of mud’s existence is, in itself, valuable”.3 
(2) “Imagine that you have a rich and generous but touchy friend. If he suspects 
you of envying his possessions, he will curtail his largesse. That is a good reason not 
to envy him… but surely it does not speak to whether his possessions are enviable. 
Another reason you might think it inappropriate to envy him would be based on 
moral qualms about being pained at a friend’s good fortune, but this too seems 
irrelevant to the ascription of the [evaluative] property [= being enviable]” (D’Arms 
and Jacobsen, 2000b, p. 74).
The first type of example describes a case where we apparently have a reason 
for a response that does not, however, bear on the value of X – the required response 
is in some way fitting, but not in the right way. The second type of example describes 
a case where we have a reason to withhold a response that does, however, bear on 
the value of X – a response that is fitting.
I
A number of solutions have been proposed to solve WKR. One type of solution 
takes the form of defending what I shall call a ‘conceptual thesis’ about attitude formation:
2 For further discussion see Blackburn (1998), Dancy (2000), D’Arms and Jacobson (2003, 2006), Gibbard 
(1990), Hieronymi (2005), Mulligan (1998), Olson (2004), Piller (2006), Stratton-Lake (2005), Stratton-Lake 
and Hooker (2006), Suikkanen (2004) and Väyrynen (2006).
3 Due to Roger Crisp (2005) and quoted in Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen (2006, p. 115).
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Conceptual Thesis: It is a conceptual truth about pro-attitude A that A is 
correct in relation to an object O only if O has some property/set of properties P 
(Persson, 2004; Bykvist, 2009).
The model here is that of belief, which according to some philosophers is 
logically constrained to be formed only in relation to truth. Belief aims at truth, as 
the slogan goes. Thus analogously, for example, the concept of admiration requires 
an acceptance of the correctness conditions for admiration (that we should only 
admire that which is, say, virtuous, a masterpiece, and so on). The solution to WKR 
then goes as follows:
(i) It is not possible for any agent to have an attitude A as a direct response 
to a reason of the wrong kind for A. 
(ii) The attitudes themselves are inherently normative: the relevant norms of 
correctness are conceptual truths about attitudes. 
(iii) Thus: WKR are not really reasons for the attitude 
(iv) Thus: there are no wrong kinds of reasons and hence no need to give 
criteria for distinguishing between wrong and right kinds of reasons.
Unfortunately, the limitations of this proposed solution to WKR are quite obvi-
ous. What counts as justifying a particular pro-attitude? Do they have equivalents 
of ‘truth of p’? On the one hand it appears that many such evaluative attitudes 
have no such constraints. When, for example, I admire something, there appear to 
be no constraints, coming from the very nature of the attitude in question, on the 
kind of features that can form its correctness conditions. That is, it does not seem 
conceptually impossible to admire anything at all, though we might of course deem 
some objects unworthy of admiration. But that would itself be a further evaluative 
(e.g. moral or aesthetic) matter, and not a logical-conceptual one.
On the other hand, however, many of the candidate constraints would 
themselves be evaluative features. For example, our admiration could/should only 
be directed at the good, or the beautiful, or the admirable. But then such an FA 
analysis would be hopelessly circular, analyzing the relevant attitudes in terms of 
some evaluative features that necessarily constrain them, while purporting to offer 
an analysis of just these features in terms of the relevant attitudes they warrant. If, 
however, we aim to appeal to certain non-evaluative features as determining the 
relevant conceptual constraints on our evaluative attitudes, we quickly run into the 
problem that often, if not always, it will be essentially contestable just what these 
features are. That is, the application of certain evaluative concepts is essentially 
contestable with respect to the non-evaluative features to which they are held to 
pertain.
Evaluative concepts are essentially contestable where there is room for dis-
pute over their application without one party to the dispute simply being guilty of 
conceptual confusion about the meaning and extension of the concept. That is, 
disagreements about value often appear to be legitimate disagreements not only 
about the extension of some concept, but also about the proper conception of 
it (for discussion, see D’Arms, 2005). People may disagree not only over whether 
particular acts are wrong, beautiful, courageous, or shameful, but also about what 
features an act needs in order to be justifiably attributed such values. So even if 
we can give a list of non-evaluative properties at which certain evaluative attitudes 
may generally, or as a matter of contingent fact always be directed, these cannot 
be conceptual constraints on those attitudes. 
These considerations, however, suggest an alternative solution to WKR in 
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terms what I shall call the ‘psychological thesis’:
Psychological Thesis: A necessary condition for a consideration’s being a 
reason for an attitude A is that A could be produced directly in agents through 
recognition of that consideration.
The model here is that of belief, where belief is conceived of as a non-voluntary 
response that occurs only in relation to evidentiary considerations. Thus, forming 
a belief on the basis of merely prudential considerations must involve indirect 
methods if it is to be done at all. Arguably, it would be impossible if relying only 
on those considerations, and some philosophers have held that this is not merely 
a psychological truth about belief, but also a conceptual truth about it. However 
that may be, the thought is that, analogously, being aware of certain properties of 
X which make, say, moral or aesthetic admiration ‘correct’ will tend to (or at least 
could) produce an admiration response, whereas being aware of those properties 
of X which make such admiration merely prudent could not, as a matter of psy-
chological impossibility, lead me to respond with admiration (Persson, 2004, for 
discussion; Bykvist, 2009).
So, the general idea is that there are psychological constraints on which atti-
tudes can be formed in response to which properties. Being aware of the properties 
which make moral admiration ‘correct’ will tend to automatically produce such a re-
sponse, whereas being aware of those properties of X which make it merely prudent 
will not automatically lead me to respond with moral admiration. Thus the wrong 
kind of reasons for responses–strategic, pragmatic, or moral considerations–are not 
really reasons for those responses because we could not have those responses as a 
direct, automatic result of being aware of them. However, as some have proposed, 
they could be reasons for wanting or intending to have the responses (e.g. Skorup-
ski, 1997; Parfit, 2001). In other words, there are no wrong kinds of reasons for 
the relevant attitudes and thus no need to give criteria for distinguishing between 
wrong and right kinds of reasons. Instead, the supposed wrong kinds of reasons 
are merely reasons to want or desire to bring about the attitude. 
Note, all that is required here is that A could be produced by direct recogni-
tion of the relevant properties/reasons, not that it necessarily will be. In any case, 
the claim is that a consideration can only be a reason for a response if being aware 
of that consideration could directly produce that response. Ought implies Can: 
How one ought to respond to X – what attitude is fitting – depends on how one 
can respond to X. I could not admire the demon as a direct response to his threat, 
for this would be psychologically impossible. But I could desire to admire him (or 
intend to do whatever is possible to get myself to admire him) as a direct response 
to his threat (Persson, 2004).
So, the wrong kind of reasons for evaluative responses – strategic or pragmatic, 
for instance – are not really reasons for those responses at all because we could not, 
as a matter of psychological necessity, have those responses as a direct result of 
being aware of them. However, they could be reasons for wanting or intending or 
trying to bring about the responses, because being aware of strategic or pragmatic 
considerations could directly produce a desire to have the response.
The obvious challenge for such an account is to show that at least some 
relevant evaluative attitudes are psychologically constrained by some set of non-
evaluative properties in the way required for FA to provide a successful analysis of 
value. I think this challenge cannot be met, primarily because, unlike in the case of 
belief, there seems to be no one-to-one correspondence between evaluative attitudes 
and sets of non-evaluative properties that constrain the attitudes in the relevant 
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way(s). Rather, for any set of non-evaluative properties there may be many incom-
patible attitudes that are ‘fitting’ to them. There are two main considerations here:
(i) Where the relevant evaluative attitude involves the application of a thin evaluative 
concept there appear to be no constraints on the kind of non-evaluative features 
that can form the attitude’s correctness conditions. There appears to be no set of 
necessary and sufficient properties something must have in order to be, say, desir-
able, valuable, preferable, morally or aesthetically admired. Note that this is so even 
where we can without circularity identify a relevant attitude, but this itself may well 
be problematic. What, for instance, is the difference in attitude – a difference we 
can specify without appealing to evaluative properties or concepts like ‘good’ or 
‘beautiful’ – between moral and aesthetic admiration? Where there do seem to be 
conditions on the application of such concepts, these will involve further evaluative 
concepts/properties – e.g. we ought to aesthetically appreciate only the ‘beautiful’; 
we ought to morally approve only of the ‘good’ – in which case we have an analysis 
of value in terms of other values, thus rendering the FA account viciously circular. 
(ii) Even where the deployment of thick concepts (courageous, garish, shameful, 
and so on) is involved – with their attendant descriptive, non-evaluative conditions 
of application – it may be essentially contestable whether, in any given case, the 
relevant non-evaluative features merit the application of the evaluative concept.
Now it may be that some examples of WKR involve cases of psychological 
impossibility, and perhaps the evil demon is a good candidate. For such cases, this 
type of solution may well offer a plausible escape from WKR. Otherwise, to deny the 
demon’s admirability in the face of possible responses of admiration would appear 
to depend on the presupposition that the demon was not in fact really admirable. 
But the key question I want to consider now is this: can FA simply presuppose this? 
For the range of evaluative concepts that are essentially contestable FA, if it is to 
remain an informative analysis, the answer must be negative. In particular, what 
counts as fitting for the application of essentially contestable concepts, and what 
is psychologically possible, will be fundamentally agent-relative matters. 
II
To see this, it is important to see that there is something problematic about 
the very way in which WKR is supposed to follow from FA via the kinds of examples 
posed above. Such examples stem from initial ‘intuitions’ about some value of X. 
This is puzzling, however, if the purported aim of FA is to analyze the value of X in 
terms of which attitudes are fitting. How can the analysis to do this job properly 
– that is, explicate the notion of ‘fittingness’ without circularity – if we’ve already 
assumed (i.e. begged the question about) the value of X? For what counts as ‘fit-
ting’ in the examples is pre-determined by the assumed value of X, whereas it 
should apparently be the other way around: the value of X should be determined 
by what counts as ‘fitting’. In short, our intuitions about the value of X should not 
be governing what attitudes count as fitting, insofar as the aim of FA is to analyze 
value in terms of just this notion.
Now one might object that this is too quick. After all, we cannot adequately 
analyze ‘fittingness’ without some initial grasp of the value of X and we can only 
begin, therefore, with some stipulation about this value. FA is designed to capture 
the intuitive sense that we ought to respond, say, with admiration only to those 
things that are really admirable, whilst recognizing that the admirable can only be 
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understood with reference to the attitude of admiration. This would be a reasonable 
response insofar as fittingness is to be understood simply as a kind of placeholder 
for whatever the correct attitude to X’s value should be, where this value is some-
how beyond dispute. Perhaps FA should not be thought of as a reductive analysis 
of value, but merely as an account that aims to shed some light on the connection 
between values and attitudes (Wiggins, 1987).
While some philosophers have taken this line, however, it is difficult to see 
what light could possibly be shed once the value of X is no longer being infor-
matively analyzed in terms of fittingness, especially where the value of X is pre-
cisely what is in dispute. Note that the problem I am raising here is not the same 
problem as the potentially vicious circularity inherent in the attempt to identify 
the relevant attitudes independently of the evaluative concepts that FA employs 
them to analyze, although that is a grave problem. Rather, I wish to emphasize 
that the understanding of FA that is supposed to lead to WKR is problematic. 
More specifically, it undermines the ability of FA to deal with evaluative concepts 
that are essentially contestable.
FA cannot, if formulated in the way that is supposed to lead to WKR, account 
in a non-question-begging way for essentially contestable evaluative concepts, 
because in such cases it just is the value of X that is in dispute and hence what 
needs to be settled. The relevant value cannot just be presupposed before FA has 
does its analyzing work. If all or most evaluative concepts turn out to be essentially 
contestable, the limited scope and informativeness of such an understanding of FA 
will prove to be deeply unattractive. But the fortunes of any plausible FA should not 
be constrained to wax or wane according to how many of our evaluative concepts 
turn out to be essentially contestable. 
III
It seems that if we do not already assume a value of X where such a value 
is essentially contestable, there may be any number of attitudes that are fitting, in 
the sense that we can provide reasons for them. An urgent question for the propo-
nent of FA is thus this: if in fact someone were able to admire the demon in virtue 
of the prudential reason confronting her – perhaps there could be people who 
are able to induce aesthetic or moral admiration in themselves at will, or perhaps 
there are agents who get their aesthetic or moral thrills from acceding to just this 
kind of demand – what on the FA analysis would prohibit the value of ‘admirable’ 
from accruing to the demon? There seems to be nothing to stop the demon being 
admirable relative to the person for whom there are reasons for having this atti-
tude and who can, as a matter of psychological fact, respond in the relevant way. 
That is, there is reason to admire the demon, and so in that sense the attitude of 
admiration will be fitting.
The question becomes more pressing with regard to the enviable friend ex-
ample. The application of essentially contestable evaluative concepts seems to be 
in large part an evaluative matter. After all, what counts as admirable, shameful, or 
enviable, for example, is surely in part a question of what to admire, or what to be 
ashamed of. What is genuinely enviable other than what one takes to be ‘worthy’ 
of envy? Insofar as ‘enviable’ is a normative, evaluative concept the question about 
its applicability, and hence the fittingness of envy in some context, surely just does 
amount to deciding what one should be envious of, but this will depend in part on 
one’s (higher-order) values and preferences as well as on the relevant non-evaluative 
features of the circumstances. If one succeeds in changing one’s attitude, changing 
what one endorses as ‘worthy of envy’, then the judgement of the ‘real’ value of 
332
Filosofi a Unisinos, 13(2-supplement):326-335, october 2012
Cain Todd
the circumstances will change accordingly. If the value of X amounts to whatever 
one judges to be the fitting attitudinal response to X, then this value will be a result 
of whatever responses one endorses as fitting. The decision about what is fitting 
will itself be an evaluative decision, in the sense that judgements about what one 
ought to feel – about what response(s) to endorse – are a matter of weighing up 
reasons. But then what counts as a ‘wrong kind of reason’ will be in part relative 
to one’s own further values, attitudes, and interests. 
An important implication of these observations seems to be that, when applied 
to essentially contestable concepts, fitting attitude analyses, understood properly 
(i.e. without unwarranted presuppositions about the very value in dispute) will not 
result in WKR as conceived in the kinds of examples given earlier. For deciding which 
reasons are the wrong/right kind is simply a natural part of the difficulty involved 
in resolving certain evaluative disputes about the applicability of such concepts. In 
other words, FA is not directly threatened by WKR in the way philosophers have 
assumed, although its ability to give any informative analysis of non-essentially 
contestable concepts remains doubtful.
A further potential implication of these considerations would be some sort 
of basic value relativism, according to which for any object X and the application 
to X of any essentially contestable evaluative concept , there may be any number 
of incompatible attitudinal responses A that are fitting, in the sense that there exist 
reasons for those responses. More formally:
Value Relativism: X has value  (or the judgement that X is  is true) if and only if a 
speaker (a) endorses some attitude A to X; (b) can in principle have A to X; (c) can 
in principle provide reasons for A in terms of the non-evaluative properties of X. 
Of course, avoiding this kind of agent-relativism about value just is the problem 
of finding independent, non-circular grounds for distinguishing the right kind of 
reason, the fitting attitude, that reflects the true value of X. Unless this can be done, 
however, it is difficult to see how FA can by itself avoid the menace of relativism, 
and its ability to avoid this is doubtful since, given the essential contestability of 
evaluative concepts, there seems to be no non question-begging way of deciding 
which responses count.
IV
Eschewing relativism, cognitivists and non-cognitivists will give different ac-
counts of what fittingness consists in (D’Arms and Jacobsen, 2000b). The former will 
claim that judgements of fittingness are not fundamentally evaluative in the way 
suggested above, but rather cognitive judgements about the real value of X. Even 
if this were right, however, it seems that the cognitivist could only maintain this 
position at the cost of rendering FA otiose. For it is hard to see how, given what I 
argued above, we could determine what the right cognitive judgement was without 
first presupposing the value of X – that is, by pointing to some evaluative property 
or other. But once this is done, once this value is presupposed, it is difficult to see 
what non-vacuous work could be achieved by giving a fitting attitude analysis of 
it. And again, such presuppositions of value are in tension with the application of 
FA to essentially evaluative concepts. This suggests, at least, that FA does not sit as 
comfortably with cognitivist accounts as has been presupposed.
Non-cognitivists need some notion of fittingness in order to explain how one’s 
first-order evaluative sentiments can come apart from one’s all-things-considered, 
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fully endorsed evaluative judgements.4 But notice that for non-cognitivists, whether 
X is truly enviable, shameful, regrettable and so on, will ultimately not be a different 
question from what one endorses as fitting. As such, non-cognitivists cannot just 
presuppose some value of X for essentially contestable concepts, since locating the 
attitudes that are genuinely fitting will instead just be the process of engaging in 
the kind of evaluative disputes typical in cases of applying essentially contestable 
concepts. For such views, therefore, as just noted above, FA applied to essentially 
contestable concepts will not result in the WKR examples typically put forward in 
the literature, because there is no prior assumption of value driving and determin-
ing the notion of fittingness. For this reason, adopting a non-cognitivist account 
of fittingness might be more amenable to holding FA, although this would be an 
unwelcome result for most proponents of FA. 
However, non-cognitivist construals of FA need to address some important 
issues, perhaps the most pressing of which is to explain cases where even our 
endorsed response differs from the value we attribute to X. Such cases, after all, 
appear to be relatively commonplace. I endorse (for moral reasons, say) not feeling 
envy towards my rich friend and yet I might still be inclined not to withhold the 
judgement that in some sense he is genuinely enviable. Note that such cases are 
importantly different from those in which, for example, I fail to feel the relevant 
response. I may fail to feel any aesthetic approbation of a masterpiece even while 
attributing ‘beauty’ to it, yet in such cases I will nevertheless endorse feeling the 
appropriate attitude and the failure to actually feel it may be explained by any 
number of quite straightforward circumstances e.g. lethargy, bad mood etc. These 
cases are thus no more or less problematic than the parallel cases of weakness of 
will for moral motivation.
Given that the point of endorsed responses is that they should become our 
actual responses and are in virtue of which the value of the object at which they are 
directed is constituted, where the endorsed response and actual responses persist 
in coming apart, we should rationally feel a tension, a clash of competing attitudes/
values: e.g. envy vs. non-envy or aesthetic pleasure vs. displeasure. 
In such an event, what sense can the non-cognitivist make of the judgement 
that the circumstance is really enviable or really beautiful? Insofar as we can make 
judgements that the circumstance is ‘really’ enviable or beautiful, irrespective of 
our actual or endorsed responses, this must be due ultimately to the presence of 
non-evaluative properties that we ‘take’ to ground the concept. This, I contend, 
can take two forms.
(i) We have a ‘conventional’ understanding that these properties constitute (i.e. 
appropriately give rise to the evaluative attitudes of) envy or aesthetic approbation 
according to some common norm or convention.
(ii) We recognize that these non-evaluative features are of the type that would 
normally, and should induce envy or aesthetic pleasure in oneself.
Thus, such cases will result either in clash of reasons and attitudes, where 
we have to make the fundamentally evaluative decision about whether to give us 
the currently endorsed response or the value we attribute to the object apparently 
independently of such a response; or one will find that one’s actual endorsement 
will not be psychologically possible, in which case we will only be able to muster a 
4 Or whatever one’s favoured non-cognitive formulation of value judgement.
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desire to have the attitude, an attitude that we see is incompatible with the value 
we actually do for whatever reasons, currently attribute to the object. In either 
case, however, there are no wrong kind of reasons as initially conceived. Rather, 
what appear to be wrong kinds of reasons will really be cases where we find it 
psychologically impossible to respond in the way that appears to be required 
of the value we attribute independently to the object, or cases where there are 
merely conflicting reasons based on the types of fundamentally evaluative con-
siderations discussed.5 
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